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Abstract 
This study is designed to support one of three major focus areas in the Naval 
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Worldwide Husbanding Improvement 
Process initiative.  Existing contracting methodologies were analyzed using the 
following methods: characteristics of existing contract vehicles within forecasting and 
simulation frameworks; strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) 
analysis, and stakeholder analysis.  Conclusions are drawn and recommendations 
are outlined for optimum methods of contracting for husbanding services as 
requested by the Worldwide Husbanding Process Improvement Action Team.  
Historical husbanding contract data were reviewed, including constraints and desired 
performance criteria.  Implementation of a flat-rate, low-variability, well-defined and 
constant set of requirements minimizes risk and price fluctuations.  Conversely, 
adoption of a cost-reimbursable contract type is both undesirable and infeasible.  A 
contracting methodology that represents a best-value trade-off within constraints 
should be flexible and risk-based while offering performance-based incentives.     
Keywords: contracting, husbanding, husbanding process improvement, 
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A husbanding services contract (HSC) is a requirements contract between 
the Navy and a husbanding services provider (HSP).  It provides a commercial 
means of obtaining services and materials for operating forces in the conduct of 
both routine and contingency operations.  HSCs provide services to U.S. Navy 
and Coast Guard ships making port calls in non-Navy ports in the absence of 
permanent logistics infrastructure.   
The NAVSUP Contracting Management Directorate (NAVSUP 02) is 
responsible for providing a strategic framework for the delivery of contracted 
services across the Navy Field Contracting System (NFCS).  NAVSUP 02 
executes policy and oversight matters on behalf of the Head of Contracting 
Agency, who is the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command.  The 
overarching goal of husbanding services contracting is to meet the needs of 
warfighters within existing regulatory constraints while providing the best value 
for taxpayers (Assad, 2006).  In addition, many stakeholders in the husbanding 
services contract process desire a more prospective pricing policy.  Specific 
goals of field contracting include: 
 Adopt a “risk-based” source selection process 
 Improve cost and spending visibility 
 Increase flexibility in support of changing operational requirements.  
 Increase use of “performance-based” evaluation methods 
 Reduce volatility in the acquisition process 
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 Streamline contract administration procedures (Shapro, 2006, 
November 29b) 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) is designated the worldwide 
executive agent for field contracting functions—including husbanding services.  
NAVSUP performs contracting functions via its seven Fleet Industrial Supply 
Centers (FISCs), which have recently regionalized their areas of responsibility 
and subsumed the Naval Regional Contracting Centers (NRCC) that previously 
executed husbanding contracts.  Figure 1 illustrates the geography and scope of 
husbanding services contracting responsibilities.  In dollar terms, the Navy 
spends approximately $80 million per year on port costs associated with 
husbanding contracts (Brown, 2007).  
 
Figure 1.   COMFISC Worldwide Husbanding Contract Coverage 
Heretofore, the NRCCs adopted widely varying husbanding contracting 
methodologies.  NAVSUP intends to adopt a standardized policy for use by all 
FISCs when evaluating and executing HSCs (Shapro, 2006, November 29c).  
This project examines internal and external organizational and environmental 
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separating actual from desired levels of performance in HSCs.  The analysis and 
tools provided are intended to assist NAVSUP in developing a uniform, 
worldwide policy governing HSCs. 
One premise for the above is that NAVSUP intends to adopt a strategic 
and consistent policy for contracting husbanding services within existing 
regulatory constraints and with due consideration for relevant stakeholders, 
including application for a U.S. Navy engaged in a global operating environment.  
Overarching questions driving contracting policy include: “What are required and 
expected end-states?” “What are the criteria for defining and obtaining optimal 
husbanding solutions, and how can alternatives be assessed for defining and 
obtaining best-value solutions?”  Additionally, policymakers must consider an 
array of regulatory and environmental constraints, performance characteristics 
and resource allocations when answering these questions and formulating policy.  
For example, an operating premise is that contracting methodologies minimizing 
administrative workload for both acquisition and afloat personnel are favored.  
Distance support is becoming increasingly challenging as shipboard manning 
decreases and logistics functions are moved ashore, adding to the workload of 
field contracting personnel (i.e., FISC).   
Goals, operational requirements, regulations and resource limitations 
determine the major boundaries of the husbanding system, including areas for 
improvement.  For example, HSCs must be flexible—particularly in terms of 
schedule changes and contingency requirements.  Although firm-fixed-price 
(FFP) contracts and bundled services may be adequate for routine operations, 
military forces must retain the needed capability of conducting sporadic, 
unanticipated and contingency operations—categorized as operations other than 
war (OOTW).  According to Joint Pub 3-07 (Joint Doctrine for Military Operations 
Other than War), OOTW are not limited to small-scale combat operations, but 
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small-scale, short-term deployment of U.S. forces.  The local knowledge of 
husbanding service providers (HSPs) is a valuable and essential resource for 
first responders.   Logic, therefore, dictates that OOTW provisions would be part 
and parcel of practically all husbanding services contracts. (Parker, 2006, 
January 25)  
Other HSC constraints result from security concerns and the regulations 
designed to deal with threat conditions.  For example, NAVSUP memo 216/6147 
(Shapro, 2007, March 9) makes Antiterrorism Force Protection (ATFP) 
considerations a key evaluation factor of contractor proposals when it states:    
It is anticipated that submissions will be rated on an 
acceptable/unacceptable basis and that it will not be part of a trade-
off analysis associated with best value procurements.  These 
business practice security procedures shall be evaluated by the 
responsible theater Navy Component Commander/Numbered Fleet 
Commander anti-terrorism/force protection personnel.  An 
unacceptable rating in this area will preclude an offerer from being 
awarded the contract (Shapro, 2007, March 9, page 1). 
Resource limitations exert a major constraint on HSC policy and 
operations, particularly during wartime.  Unfortunately, the current field 
contracting environment now routinely echoes with the refrain of, “Do more with 
less.”  Field contracting activities award a larger number of contracts at lower 
average dollar amounts when compared to systems contracting.  Additionally, 
services contracts require an extensive amount of monitoring effort.  Figures 2 
and 3 illustrate the high-volume, low-dollar nature of NAVSUP field contracting.  
Figure 4 illustrates the result of field contracting trends on the acquisition 









Figure 2.   Navy Contract Actions 2005 
 








Figure 4.   NAVSUP Contracting Offices On-Board Personnel and Obligations 
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Figure 5.   Major Components of Spending 
Figure 5 illustrates the shrinking discretionary budget from which the DoD 
draws its acquisition resources.  The converging trends of increasing mandatory 
spending and decreasing discretionary resources create increasing pressure and 
oversight aimed at increasing efficiency, reducing cost, and obtaining best-value 
services.  Competitive sourcing, performance-based award criteria, and acquisition 
reform are the mechanisms designed to achieve better results with fewer resources.   
A U.S. withdrawal from permanent, forward-basing areas and increasingly 
dispersed foreign conflicts has actually increased the need for forward-deployed 
logistic support.  Although HSCs are a requirements type contract for naval forces, 
USCG, MSC, and U.S. Army ships have the option to place orders against HSCs 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 8- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
interim measure for all services to use until organic logistics augmentation arrives.  
Therefore, HSCs add a flexible response option for forward-deployed logistics 
support.     
B. CONTEXT 
Figure 6 summarizes the context and relevance of this project.  NAVSUP 
assembled the Husbanding Process Improvement Working Group, Force Protection 
Working Group, and Worldwide Cost Reporting and Forecasting Tool Architecture 
Review Board to analyze and assist with managing the changing contracting 
environment while pursuing the HSC goals described earlier.  This project supports 
the Husbanding Process Improvement Working Group and provides contracting 









do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 9- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
C. PROJECT DELIVERABLES 
As requested by the NAVSUP Contracting Directorate, this project delivers 
the following: 
 A standardized policy recommendation for husbanding services 
contracting at Fleet Industrial Support Centers worldwide. 
 A scope for policy implementation; and 
 A services cost and frequency forecasting model. 
Deliverable three is implicit to the researchers’ development and support of 
contracting policy and scope.  Evaluation and forecasting tools are critical to the 
reevaluation of best-value alternatives as performance requirements, external 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND HUSBANDING 
PRACTICE 
A. HUSBANDING PRACTICE 
1. U.S. Navy Husbanding Practice 
NAVSUP defines a husbanding services contract (HSC) as, “A husbanding 
contract awarded to provide services to U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships making 
port calls in non-Navy ports” (Parker, 2006, January 25).  In recent years, however, 
this definition has expanded to include a scalable response to operations other than 
war (OOTW) and other contingency situations in which no permanent logistics 
infrastructure is present.  U.S. Navy HSCs are typically indefinite quantity, indefinite 
delivery (IDIQ) task orders that include fixed-price contract line-item numbers 
(CLINs) invoked as required.  IDIQ task orders are used because the exact times 
and/or quantities of future deliveries are unknown at the time of the award.  The 
major cost elements of a HSC are: 
 HSP daily fee (1st day + subsequent days) 
 Port Tariff fees 
 CLIN services 
 Non-CLIN services 
(Shapro, 2007, April 4) 
All husbanding contracts include some degree of firm-fixed-price (FFP) and 
IDIQ delivery terms.  The husbanding service provider (HSP) daily fee is a flat rate 
per day, independent of services subcontracted.  Pre-negotiated CLIN services are 
reimbursed at the flat, negotiated rate per unit of service.   Port tariff items typically 
vary by port, ship class, date, time, and other factors dictated by port authority 
policy.  Port tariff items and services not specifically listed in the HSC (non-CLIN 
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contingencies because they provide capabilities that are not defined in advance and 
because they take advantage of the HSP’s knowledge of local market conditions and 
resources. 
The “market basket” HSC approach refers to a division of CLIN and non-CLIN 
services.  The “basket” of CLIN services, along with the HSP daily fees and 
estimated port costs, are negotiated at an estimated rate per unit of service 
provided.  Subcontracts and items not negotiated in the HSC (i.e., non-CLIN items), 
yet required for specific port-visits, are reimbursable at cost as supported by the 
subcontractor’s invoice without any additional cost or profit allowances in 
accordance with FAR 52.244-2.  FAR 13.302-2 (Unpriced Purchase Orders) also 
applies when the total value of the order is under $100,000 and DFARS 217.74 
(Unpriced Purchase Orders) also applies when the total value of the order exceeds 
$100,000.       
2. Commercial Husbanding Practice 
Although frequently used interchangeably in practice, the terms “Husbanding 
Service Provider” and “Husbanding Agent” are not synonymous.  The term “provider” 
is more appropriate in military husbanding practice because “agents” are authorized 
to act for or in place of another.  However, U.S. law prohibits contractors from 
entering into agreements on behalf of the U.S. government.  The researchers chose 
Patrick Corporation, a provider of both military and commercial husbanding services, 
as a representative case study to compare military and commercial husbanding 
practice.  Located in Australia, Patrick Defence Logistics (military husbanding 
services) and Patrick Marine Agencies (commercial husbanding agency) are 
subsidiaries of the Patrick Corporation and provide port services in numerous ports 
from Gladstone and Darwin, Australia to the Solomon Islands, East Timor, India and 
Micronesia.  This agency is representative of commercial husbanding practice 
because it provides general husbanding, port services, and a complete range of 
land-based services to shipping lines, freight forwarding agents, customs brokers, 
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Marine Agencies are Queensland Alumina Limited (QAL), the world’s largest 
alumina refinery, and Rio Tinto, the world’s leading mining company (The Patrick 
Corporation, n.d.). 
Patrick Marine Agencies’ HSCs are structured as a “flat rate” per ship and per 
port call.  The flat rate fee includes a bundle of services such as: 
 Foreign vessel tramp service (cargo transportation)  
 Service to vessels  
o Preliminary arrangements 
o Coordination of all requirements 
o Communication and interpreter services 
o Trash, sewage, waste oil removal 
o Crane and forklift service 
o Water taxi service 
o Bus service 
Other services, however, are reimbursed at actual cost with supporting 
documentation.  Reimbursable services are highly variable due to market and 
economic conditions outside of Patrick Corporation’s control.  For example, the 
number and size of ships entering port, personal needs of the principals (Owner, 
Ship Manager, Commanding Officer), and fluctuating fuel prices would cause price 
changes for services such as: 
 Pilots, tugs and line handlers 
 Stevedores 
 Currency Exchange 
(Magoffin, 2007, April 4) 
Patrick Marine Agencies is able to offer a fixed-price bundle of services 
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predictable, low-variability stream of services.  Patrick Marine Agencies is also able 
to segregate low- and high-variability costs because of superior market research and 
historical data.  “Arranging and booking” fees are well known in advance, and ship 
schedules do not change on short notice.  The tugs, pilot, linesman, marine oil 
pollution levy, and state conservancy dues are port tariff fees arranged for a fixed-
price.  The low-variability vessel services are dependent upon three factors:  
 Length overall (LOA) 
 Gross Registered Tonnage  
 Net Registered Tonnage 
Husbanding services depend upon the commercial vessel’s type of charter.  
Billing is further segregated into the three types of charters described below:   
Time Charter — The ship is chartered for a set period of time.  The 
owner still manages the vessel, but those that 
chartered the vessel select the destination ports and 
control the operation of the ship.   
Voyage Charter — The vessel is chartered for a single voyage.  The 
ship’s owner and crew manage and operate the 
vessel.   
Bareboat Charter — The party chartering the vessel takes full control of the 
vessel, along with all legal and financial 
responsibilities, to include a fleet manning company to 
operate the vessel. 
Patrick Marine husbanding agents provide daily working summaries to the 
Principal, along with digital pictures (if requested) when loading items such as 
alumina.  Invoices include both fixed and cost-reimbursable expenses as well as 
cost amounts from the various sub-contractors.  Both agent and principal have full 
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3. Contingency Operations 
“Operations other than war” (OOTW) refers to contingency operations as 
defined in FAR 2.101.  The FAR definition of OOTW includes rescue and 
humanitarian relief missions, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), and 
unplanned deployment of troops for an indefinite period of time (Wilkins, 2007, May 
14).   Logistics Support includes goods and services provided for both routine and 
OOTW operations.  Logistics Support can take place in the immediate vicinity of the 
operation or a great distance away—even in a different country.  Since HSCs are 
already in place throughout the world, they are an opportune support mechanism for 
OOTW.  In light of the joint and geographically dispersed operating environment in 
which U.S. forces must operate, NAVSUP Memorandum 201/6025 established the 
requirement for all HSCs to include OOTW provisions (Shapro, 2007, March 9).    
IDIQ HSCs are well-suited to contingency operations because husbanding service 
providers are familiar with the locales under their cognizance and can offer greater 
speed of support than U.S. contracting officers who accompany contingent forces. 
Port services contract line-item numbers (CLINs) provide a useful initial 
response because of their flexibility.  They offer an in situ process for obtaining non-
contract supplies and services.  HSCs are the first tier of the Navy’s scalable 
response to contingency events.  For example, HSCs provided the initial response 
capabilities following hurricane Katrina.  Escalating tiers of response include in-
theater FISC field contracting support, LOGCAP, and establishment of joint 
contracting commands (Shapro, 2006, November 29a).  The flexibility and capability 
to project forces outside the U.S. requires immediate and sustained support 
services—such as those established by husbanding support contracts.   
In support of these demanding performance requirements, HSPs must be 
familiar with the manner in which the U.S. Navy operates.  The service provider must 
have a network familiar with the different political and commercial infrastructures, 
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covered by the contract.  In order to support the Navy’s initial OOTW response, the 
HSP must furnish personnel with the following minimum qualifications: 
 Ability to speak the local language in the country where OOTW are 
being conducted 
 Capacity to travel to the forward logistics site within 24 hours of 
notification 
 Current inoculation records 
 Possession of a valid passport and appropriate licenses to conduct 
business 
The HSP’s designated point of contact must be available 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, throughout the OOTW or contingency operation.  The point of 
contact or alternative assists the on-site government representative in fulfilling 
logistical requirements including, but not limited to; translation services, source 
identification, liaison with local political and police authorities, and any other official 
requirements (Wilkins, 2007, April 20). 
Notably, the government Contracting Officer is not relieved of his/her duty to 
negotiate a “fair and reasonable” price for these items at the time of placing the 
order.  One of the deliverables of this project is a tool to aid contracting officers in 
making this “fair and reasonable” determination and acquiring “best-value” products 
and services on behalf of the government.  
Submarine rescue efforts are marked by their dependence on interagency 
cooperation and swift execution for success.  Rescue systems, support ships, airlift, 
medical treatment and material handling equipment must assemble rapidly in remote 
locations and on short notice.  The time-critical nature of submarine rescue requires 
rapid execution of clearly established logistics and coordination procedures among 
all available resources to locate a disabled submarine and commence rescue of its 
crew within the limits of crew survival systems.  One of the lessons learned from the 
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need for an international liaison service to coordinate rescue efforts taking place in 
international waters (Wilkins, 2006, April 18).  
Key actors in submarine rescue efforts include: 
 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
 Commander Naval Submarine Forces (SUBFOR) 
 International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office 
(ISMERLO) 
 Deep Submergence Unit (DSU) 
 Combatant Commanders and Operational Commanders 
 U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) 
 Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
When responding to a submarine crisis, the NAVSUP supported command 
will generally be the nearest FISC providing direct support.  Commander Fleet 
Industrial Supply Center (COMFISCS) serves as the primary liaison between outside 
organizations and the lead FISC.  In this role, COMFISC identifies HSCs that can be 
used in support of submarine rescue operations.  Prior engagement with husbanding 
service providers during HSC solicitations will allow NAVSUP to leverage HSP 
capabilities during a submarine rescue scenario.  Similar to OOTW operations, 
submarine rescue provisions must be included as key evaluation criteria for HSCs.  
Submarine rescue technical requirements and coordination issues must be well 
understood by the HSP to increase the likelihood of success.  For example, a recent 
submarine rescue statement of work calls for the HSP to provide (within 12-18 
hours) the following technical requirements common to submarine rescue 
operations: 
 Material Handling Equipment (cranes, k-loaders, forklifts) 
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 Support Services (customs, welders, traffic control, permits) 
 Translation and Interpreter Services 
 Host Country Logistics  
 Cold Weather Gear 
(Wilkins, 2006, April 18) 
B. CONTRACTING METHOD CHARACTERISTICS 
Cost-type contracts are least desirable to the Government because they 
present higher risk and because the Government has minimal audit authority or 
capability outside the U S.  The current fixed-price contract structure is driven by 
multiple factors including:   
 Husbanding services are acquired as a commercial service—to which 
the FAR gives preference.    
 Established fixed-prices better accommodate the logistics requirement 
(LOGREQ) ordering process used for U.S. Navy port-visits. 
 Vendors and subcontractors outside the U.S. frequently do not have 
accounting systems adequate for cost analysis or cost-type contracts.  
Figure 7 summarizes the characteristics of contracting methodologies that are 
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Figure 7.   Contracting Methodology Characteristics 
1. Statement of Objectives (SOO) 
One analyst explains:  
When a contract is based on performance, all aspects of the contract 
are structured around the purpose of the work to be performed rather 
than the manner in which it is to be done.  The buyer seeks to elicit the 
best performance the seller has to offer, at a reasonable price or cost, 
by stating its objectives and giving sellers both latitude in determining 
how to achieve them and incentives to achieve them (Brandis, 2001, 
February).   
FAR 37 requires performance-based contracting to “the maximum extent 
practicable” and FAR 37.602 allows for use of either a statement of objectives 
(SOO) or a statement of work (SOW) to describe performance-based acquisition 
requirements.  SOWs describe performance criteria to prospective offerers and the 
terms of the resulting performance work statement become part of the contract.  
Contracting officers issue a SOO to prospective offerers, who then propose the 
performance work statement.  The SOO does not become part of the contract.  The 
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performance-based acquisition objectives.  SOOs maximize the performance and 
flexibility characteristics of a contract.   
2. Indefinite Delivery Task Orders 
FAR 16.501-1 defines an indefinite delivery task order contract as, “A contract 
for services that does not procure or specify a firm quantity of services and that 
provides for the issuance of orders for the performance of tasks during the period of 
the contract.”  FAR 16.504 defines an indefinite-quantity contract as one that 
provides for an indefinite quantity of supplies or services, within stated limits and 
during a fixed period.  Contracting officers may use an indefinite delivery indefinite 
quantity (IDIQ) task order when they cannot predetermine, above a specified 
minimum, the precise quantities of supplies or services that the government will 
require during the contract period.  However, this contracting method may be used 
only when a recurring need for the service is anticipated.  When using an IDIQ task 
order, the contracting officer is also responsible for establishing a reasonable 
maximum quantity of services to be provided by the HSP.  Therefore, the contracting 
officer requires some method of forecasting this reasonable maximum quantity.  The 
IDIQ methodology lies left of center in the spectrum of Figure 7.  Its primary 
advantage is added flexibility in both quantity and delivery schedule.  It also adds the 
capability to prearrange negotiated contract services for requirements that have not 
yet materialized.  
3. Award Fee 
When contracting for services, contracting officers must recognize that not all 
relevant evaluation criteria can be measured objectively.  Therefore, consideration of 
both objective and subjective criteria is appropriate when selecting a contracting 
methodology.  “Award fees” are based on subjective evaluation factors and 
“incentive fees” are based on objective evaluation factors.  Where incentive fees 
motivate cost savings (often to the detriment of quality), award fees motivate 
performance and quality—both imperative in HSCs.  Of note, award-fee criteria are 
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The award fee methodology lies in the middle of the Figure 7 spectrum.  
Award fees are distinguished by the qualitative nature of the award fee criteria, a 
feature that adds administrative burden, but provides an incentive mechanism.  This 
tradeoff is worthwhile when performance is more important than administrative 
burden.  In the U.S. Navy HSC context, the administrative burden falls on the 
contracting activity and should be transparent to the operational user.   
In an award-fee plan, the contracting parties negotiate an agreement on the 
amount of money to be included in an award-fee pool.  Next, they agree on 
performance evaluation criteria and a mechanism for grading performance in this 
area.  In some cases, the parties also negotiate a base fee, which is a fixed fee that 
the seller will earn no matter how its performance is evaluated.   The contract 
performance period is then divided into award-fee periods.  A part of the award-fee 
pool is allocated to each period proportionate to the percentage of the work 
scheduled to be completed.  All of this information is included in the award-fee plan, 
which becomes a part of the contract.  In some cases, the contract allows the buyer 
to change the award-fee plan unilaterally before the start of the new award-fee 
period (Brandis, 2001, February). 
An award-fee plan also includes elements such as rollover terms, payment 
terms, award-fee board members, fee determining official, and performance 
advisors.  The award-fee board evaluates contractor performance on a regular basis 
and recommends a portion of the award fee to be allocated to the contractor based 
upon its assessment of the contractor’s performance during that period.  The overall 
subjective assessment of performance must be converted to dollar amount of award 
fee in accordance with an agreed-upon conversion scheme.  When combined with a 
firm-fixed-price contract, the resulting contract is characterized as fixed-price award 
fee (FPAF), but retains its designation as a FFP contract IAW FAR 16.201-1.  This 
distinction is relevant when contracting for commercial services. 
Most importantly, award-fee criteria may be unilaterally adjusted by the 
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explicitly define the evaluation criteria in the contract, the Government has maximum 
flexibility to incentivize acquisition focus areas as the contracting environment 
changes and new requirements emerge.  This flexibility gives the Government a tool 
to focus on areas identified for improvement.  When removing the base fee, as is 
appropriate when using a FFP contract where the HSP receives a daily fee, award 
fees isolate and tie performance objectives to key performance parameters.   
 Disadvantages of the award-fee tool include:  
 Payments from different fee pools must be tracked 
 Additional manpower is required to monitor award fee boards 
 Regular performance evaluations are a drain on administrative 
resources 
In fact, FAR 16.404(b)(1) specifically states that the benefits of an award fee 
contract must exceed the cost of implementation.   
Award fees are an important incentive mechanism despite the drawbacks 
cited above because flexibility and performance are critical to the success of 
husbanding services contracts.  FAR 37.601(b)(2) states that performance-based 
contracts for services shall include measurable performance standards and a 
method of assessing contractor performance against those performance standards.  
Furthermore, FAR 37.601(b)(3) directs that contracts shall use performance 
incentives where appropriate.  Incentives are appropriate in the current HSC 
environment because performance is critical, yet HSP performance beyond 
minimum requirements is limited.  Many “measurable” performance standards are 
subjective, yet key to HSC success.  The added cost of administration is less than 
the potential benefits—particularly when used in conjunction with larger scope and 
volume husbanding services contracts.     
4. “Market Basket” Approach  
Husbanding contracts that utilize the “market basket” approach provide the 
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capabilities specified in the bundle regardless of whether a particular ship requires 
all of the services.  While this method reduces variability (and risk) for the HSP, it 
increases risk to the Government because services not included in the bundle must 
be reimbursed at cost.  The reduced variability makes services in the market basket 
cheaper and more visible for cost estimation.  The customer has a port services 
“template” available for each area visited and can budget within a narrow range of 
costs.  Variations in port-visit costs result from variable volume items (i.e., sewage 
and potable water) and from items not negotiated as part of the market basket (i.e., 
non-CLIN items).  A market basket approach takes advantage of known, recurring 
and high-usage items to lower price risk.  This approach lies to the right of center in 
Figure 7 and relies on an accurate knowledge of both service type and frequency to 
be effective.     
As the award term of a market-basket-type contract grows, price uncertainty 
grows.  HSPs then have an incentive to factor in contingencies and shift services 
provided to cost reimbursement where possible.  Conversely, when the cost of 
negotiated services decreases, HSPs have no incentive to seek out the best price 
for the Government because they do not share in any cost savings.   
5. Flat Rate Plus Cost 
Husbanding contracts that utilize the “flat rate plus cost” contracting 
methodology establish a schedule of daily charges based on ship class and port.  
The flat rate is inclusive of all items under the husbanding agent’s control and 
negotiated in the contract terms.  Personal services and commodities subject to 
market fluctuation are billed at cost.  This approach maximizes the bundling of 
services, greatly simplifies billing, and allows the customer to precisely budget for 
port-visits.   
The flat-rate-plus-cost approach depends on low-variability service 
requirements and predictable scheduling for success.  The flat rate approach also 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 24- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
containment measures.  Therefore, it is not well suited to the unpredictable 
scheduling requirements and highly volatile demands of military OOTW and 
contingency operations.  This approach is primarily used by commercial vessels.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Modeling Techniques 
Forecasting is an attempt to predict future conditions based on historical data, 
trends, or empirical relationships.  Accurate forecasts enable sound business 
decisions.  Within the husbanding services context, forecasting can be used to 
predict service usage rates, port-visit frequency, and a confidence interval of port-
visit services costs.  For example, the forecasting model developed in this project is 
a quantitative, time-series model that uses historical data observations of port-visits, 
services, and costs from 2001 through 2006 to generate a predicted mean, standard 
deviation, and confidence interval for future cost and usage rates.  While historical 
CRAFT data is available, it must be transformed into predictive information to enable 
prospective pricing.  The primary limitation of the forecasting model used was the 
accuracy and completeness of available data.    
Accurate forecasting of requirements allows procurement planners to support 
performance and schedule requirements, remain within budgeted funds, adhere to 
laws and regulations, and identify acceptable risks and tradeoffs.  Better knowledge 
of probable future conditions lowers risk.  When applied to husbanding services 
contracting, forecasting enables a targeted port-visit planning approach using a risk-
based acquisition strategy.   
Simulation is the process of studying the behavior of an ideal system by using 
a model that replicates the behavior of the system experiment (Apte, 2006, July).  
Simulation allows the user to conduct “what-if” experiments without tangible 
consequences and with considerable time compression.  The value of this tool in the 
context of this project is the ability to develop an interval of probable costs based on 
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Ball™ simulation software to iteratively simulate port-cost and frequency 
probabilities.  Probability of a cost outcome, in turn, allows the contracting officer to 
make a “fair and reasonable” price determination for a bid proposal and to negotiate 
high-probability requirements in future contracts.    
2. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) Analysis 
SWOT analysis is a simple framework for generating strategic alternatives 
from a situation analysis.  It is a tool for auditing an organization in light of changing 
environmental forces, factors and trends.  SWOT analysis can help decision makers 
formulate strategic alternatives to emerging issues by building on current 
organizational strengths and mitigating weaknesses.  Specifically, the role of SWOT 
analysis is to develop rational and systematic options for dealing with critical issues 
facing decision-makers.  Issues can derive both from internal and external 
environmental factors with the commonality that senior executives routinely prioritize 
which issues must be dealt with, including how and when.  SWOT analysis typically 
results in an issue agenda and alternatives for resolution or mitigation in consonance 
with an organization’s goals and objectives.   
SWOT analysis begins with a situation analysis that objectively describes 
internal and external environmental factors in terms of strategic fit between external 
opportunities and internal strengths, acknowledging current weaknesses and future 
threats.  Internal analysis includes descriptions of relevant organizational variables, 
e.g., workforce characteristics, technology concerns, and decision-making, rewards, 
and communication structures and processes.  External analysis includes 
descriptions of environmental factors and trends, including organizational 
stakeholders supportive or non-supportive of the organization concerning important 
issues (Keeley, n.d.).  Organizational strengths can be prime sources of capabilities 
that can be used for developing and sustaining competitive advantage, e.g., 
reputation and brand image, resources and assets, experience, knowledge, 
marketing quality, location, accreditations, qualifications, certifications, logistic 
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barriers to attaining and sustaining competitive advantage, e.g., lack of key skills, 
aging or retiring workforce, flawed reputation, financial difficulties, scheduling 
constraints, and cultural resistance to change. 
External analysis identifies future opportunities, e.g., favorable market 
developments, competitor vulnerabilities, favorable demographic trends, geography, 
and partnerships.  Threats are future external forces that typically inhibit competitive 
advantage, e.g., restrictive or complicated government regulations, political and 
legislative party changes, adverse environmental trends, disruptive technological 
developments, economic variability and demographic shifts (Internet Center for 
Management and Business Administration, n.d.). 
3. Stakeholder Analysis 
R. Edward Freeman defines a stakeholder as, “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objective” 
(Freeman, 1984).  Stakeholder analysis is the process of identifying stakeholders, 
their interest areas, and their potential to influence an organization’s actions.  The 
objective of stakeholder analysis is to identify potential supporters and 
nonsupporters concerning organizational policy and activity changes, and strategies 
for influencing different stakeholders.  Identifying influential stakeholders and 
interpreting their needs and expectations is crucial for organizational performance, 
particularly in the public sector where pluralism is the norm.   
Relevant attributes of individual and group stakeholders range from historical 
relationships to control of assets, to the amount of power a stakeholder can bring to 
bear on a particular issue.  Stakeholder power broadly refers to the ability to cause 
or prevent change, typically by influencing values, strategy, decision-making, policy, 
and implementation.  Activating power or tactics range from competitive to collective 
means.  Stakeholder legitimacy refers to a claim based on contractual, legal, moral, 
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dimension, in that urgency becomes a practical necessity when attempting to move 
a bureaucratic institution (Mitchell, 1997, October). 
Stakeholder attributes can be grouped accordingly: 
Dormant — possess power, but no legitimacy or urgency (power only) 
Discretionary — possess legitimacy, but no power or urgency 
Demanding — possess urgency, but no power or legitimacy 
Dominant — possess both power and legitimacy (claim and means to 
influence) 
Dependent — possess both legitimacy and urgency, but no power 
Dangerous — possess both urgency and power, but no legitimate claim 
Definitive — possess power, legitimacy, and urgency (priority and 
immediate action)  
(Mitchell, 1997, October) 
Although stakeholders have varying degrees of potential to affect outcomes, 
dominant and definitive classes in particular require higher management attention 
and priority.  Finally, after identifying and prioritizing stakeholders, an organization 
can attempt to identify and align stakeholder needs and expectations with 
organizational objectives.  Stakeholder interests may be evident from their historical 
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III. CURRENT HUSBANDING PROCESS ISSUES  
A November 2006 husbanding services project report cited 10 key “facts” 
from which husbanding services contractual issues derive:  
1. Firm-fixed-price (FFP) contract type is most desirable. 
2. Some services are standard: CHT, water, tugs, trash, oily waste, pilotage. 
3. Fixed-price services contracting for a 3-5 year period is a risk for 
contractors due to: 
a. Escalating costs and unknown premiums for short notice port-visits 
b. Leads to contingency pricing 
c. No incentive to get the best price 
d. Gaming in proposed pricing 
e. No evaluation of the subcontractor pricing structure 
4. Risk results in an emphasis on “profit” versus “quality” of services 
5. During port-visits, services are in a constant state of flux—without 
modifications reflecting all changes.  No monitoring of process. 
6. Reconciliation of the total order does not take place until payment. 
7. Cost-type contracts are least desirable due to: 
a. More risk for the Government 
b. Contractors do not have approved cost accounting systems (CAS) 
& Government has minimal audit capability OCONUS 
c. FAR allows burdens on subcontract costs 
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9. [Inadequate] assurance that subcontracting price arrangements are fair 
and reasonable 
10. FAR 42.204(a)(1)(iii) – anticipates the use of a firm fixed-price contract 
that exceeds the SAT under which unpriced contract actions (including 
unpriced modifications and delivery orders) may be executed 
(Husbanding Process Improvement Team, 2006)  
A. FIRM-FIXED-PRICING STRUCTURE 
FAR 37.102 lists the precedence for services acquisition and is the source for 
fact #1 above.  Although FFP contracts are desirable because they reduce risk and 
uncertainty for the government, FFP contracts that span several years expose the 
contractor to unacceptable risk.  Low profit margins and high cost risk for the 
contractor incentivizes unbalanced pricing using reimbursable, non-CLIN services.  
FFP contracts also incentivize contingency pricing in the contract negotiation phase 
and fail to incentivize cost containment beyond the negotiated price during the 
contract execution phase.  In contrast, cost-reimbursement contracts are least 
desirable because risk shifts to the government and because most overseas 
contractors lack adequate accounting systems to document cost data.    
B. REQUIRED TRADE-OFFS 
Wide variability in port location, ship type, and ship schedules also makes a 
one-size-fits-all HSC solution problematic.  Several of the field contracting goals 
described above conflict with one another, creating a need for compromise.  The 
magnitude and direction of the compromise is ultimately a matter of subjective 
weighting.  One area of trade-off exists between performance and administrative 
burden.  Increased monitoring and oversight increase the likelihood of acceptable 
contract performance, but increase the administrative burden on acquisition 
personnel.   
Another trade-off exists between award-period length and contractor 
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develop more stable supplier and subcontractor relationships, realize returns on 
capital investments, and reduce contract administration.  The trade-offs for longer 
contract award periods are reduced contractor incentive after award and reduced 
levels of competition.     
Finally, a trade-off exists between ease of use and economy.  Discrete billing 
and services arrangements maximize flexibility at the expense of added complexity 
and tracking requirements.  Ordering, budgeting, and accounting are easier for the 
buyer using a bundled approach.  Conversely, a discrete, itemized approach 
requires a higher level of monitoring and oversight by field contracting personnel—
increasingly from remote locations. 
C. MONITORING REQUIREMENTS 
Monitoring issues manifest themselves in several areas of husbanding 
services contracts.  The volume of contract actions alluded to above is a function of 
geographic contract scope, contractor management skill, contract length, and 
acquisition policy.  A smaller acquisition workforce responsible for administering a 
growing number of contracts presents challenges to conducting adequate oversight.  
Incentivizing HSPs to collect and share cost data and utilizing software to analyze 
trends are a few examples of tools that can mitigate the risk of inadequate oversight 
without unacceptably increasing administrative workload.  However, the utility of 
these databases is limited to the quality of user inputs.  Fleet customers have even 
less time in their operational schedule for data input than their shore-based 
counterparts.  Local subcontractors often face language and technology barriers in 
submitting accurate cost data.  In short, the acquisition workforce relies on external 
parties (with minimal incentive) to remotely monitor contract performance.  The 
result is a cost-reporting database with incomplete and non-standardized 
information.  A significant corollary to this deficiency is an inability to accurately 
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D. INADEQUATE COMPETITION 
The same government regulations and oversight that increase the workload 
of the acquisition workforce increase the cost of competing for contracts.  The 
average solicitation document for a single husbanding services contract exceeds 
100 pages.  When combined with the legal language of the clauses and language 
barriers of differing host countries, the difficulty in forming proposals and 
understanding performance based objectives acts as a deterrent to prospective 
bidders (Verrastro, 1996).  Bidding for government contracts is time-consuming and 
expensive.  Furthermore, risks to the bidder are considerable even if a contract is 
awarded.  Most contracts are of the FFP variety with the added uncertainty inherent 
in IDIQ contracts.  Since any reimbursable costs are based on invoice price, there is 
little room for contractor profit beyond the fixed daily rate.  High administrative costs, 
uncertainty, and a lack of performance incentives discourage competitive bidding.  
More often than not, agents with extensive commercial experience and supplier 
contacts in ports frequented by Navy ships lack the resources and motivation to bid 
for Government husbanding contracts because there are inadequate monetary 
incentives.  According to one port agent: 
Preparing Government proposals takes a significant amount of time, 
manpower and money.  We prepared a proposal for one Government 
command at an expense to our company of about $12,000.00 over an 
eight-week period.  Several months later, the Government activity 
canceled the solicitation.  If all proposals cost us this much, we would 
not be able to stay in business (Verrastro, 1996).   
Hence, the cost and length of the solicitation process are inversely related to 
the level of competition.   
E. INADEQUATE MARKET RESEARCH INFORMATION 
1. Fair and Reasonable Determinations 
Contracting officers are required to conduct “fair and reasonable 
determinations” as part of the proposal evaluation process.  However, they often 
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Consequences of regionalization and fewer acquisition personnel dispersed 
throughout areas of fleet operations are decreased local market awareness and 
increased reliance on external data sources.  High personnel turnover and high 
transaction volume, particularly in forward-deployed areas exacerbate this issue.  
The model and analysis provided in this project are intended to assist acquisition 
personnel in forecasting port-visit frequency and expenses, making fair and 
reasonable determinations based on cost data, and negotiating follow-on HSCs 
based on adequate market research.  
To illustrate the magnitude of this issue, consider 5th fleet estimated annual 
husbanding services costs of approximately $10 million for budget year 2006—
contrasted to over $22 million in actual costs incurred over the same period 
(Couture, 2007, March 24).  When contracting activities do not accurately forecast 
and manage HSC costs, they may unnecessarily obligate funds that could be used 
for other purposes or (in this case) fail to set aside sufficient funding and later pull 
funding from other budget areas. 
2. Accuracy of Cost Data 
Current market research data on port costs are available from the Cost 
Reporting and Forecast Tool (CRAFT) database.  CRAFT is a “commercially 
developed application designed to provide decision makers with detailed cost 
information in formats that permit detailed advanced planning for port-visits and 
accurately capture costs to monitor contract performance” (Casey, 2006).  
WWCRAFT is a proposed update to the legacy CRAFT database that offers 
significant improvement of husbanding cost capture, forecasting and identification of 
excessive charges. The improved formatting, detail, and segregation of cost data 
can provide a significant return on investment by offering a more current, accurate, 
and complete picture of port-cost data.  The WWCRAFT update addresses many 
deficiencies in the legacy CRAFT database, but is not yet functional or populated 
with data.  Inconsistencies in current data result from a lack of immediate and direct 
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report inputs from fleet users who have limited access to detailed cost data and who 
have minimal time available within their operating schedules to submit detailed port-
visit reports.  The adage, “garbage in—garbage out” applies to port-visit data 
collection and analysis.  Other shortcomings of legacy CRAFT include limited 
standardization of input format and limited ability to tailor management information 
reports.      
3. Lack of Visibility and Oversight 
Although NAVSUP requires OOTW provisions in all husbanding services 
contracts, the researchers were unable to identify any system for segregating and 
tracking OOTW expenditure data.  Perhaps the inadequacy of legacy CRAFT data 
described above is the cause.  Other expenditure data raise issues of suspect billing 
practice.  For example, 5th Fleet expense data for budget years 2006 and 2007 
(included as Appendices 1 and 2) segregate CLIN and non-CLIN services and 
further break down services by description.  However, numerous non-CLIN 
descriptions (billed at cost) seem to match CLIN descriptions (billed at fixed-price) 
for services provided during the same accounting period (Morgan, 2007).  While 
regional husbanding service providers can track, manipulate, and extract useful 
management data using their cost analysis software, contracting officers cannot, 
given their current software tool set.  This gap in capability puts HSPs at a distinct 
advantage when making business decisions based on cost and price analysis—
particularly during evaluation of bidder proposals and negotiation of follow-on 
contract rates.  
F. PORT TARIFF FEE STRUCTURE  
Port tariff fee structures are often viewed as immutable rates dictated by host 
nation port authorities.  Although time-consuming to negotiate, rate decreases are 
possible.  Furthermore, if rate decreases are targeted at high-usage ports and 
focused on high-volume services, the savings can be significant.  In this sense, port 
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March 24).  Adequate knowledge of significant volume, metered services, however, 
is necessary to identify and negotiate discounted fees.  Consider the following 
example extracted from actual BY 2006 port-cost data (Appendix 1).  The metered 
services shore electrical, bilge water removal, CHT removal, and potable water 
account for 42.7% ($4,026,376.75) of total expenses.  If a modest, 3% reduction in 
port tariff fees could be negotiated for these services, estimated cost savings would 
exceed $120,000 per year in the port of Bahrain alone.      
The practice of discounting port tariff rates is not unprecedented.  The “Green 
Flag Incentive Program” in Long Beach, CA, offers “most-favored” port tariff rates, 
including a 15% discount on docking fees, for vessels that demonstrate 
environmentally friendly steaming practices in and around port (Port Authority of 
Long Beach, 2007, March 2).  Examination of the BY 2006 port-visit costs in 
Appendix 1 reveals focus areas for port tariff rate negotiations.  The ports of Mina 
Sulman and Jebel Ali combined to account for over 80% of days in port during 
budget year 2006 (Morgan, 2007).  
G. INADEQUATE TRACKING OF NON-CLIN SERVICES 
Extraction of market research data currently requires a manual review of 
individual remarks fields within the legacy CRAFT database to identify OOTW and 
non-CLIN expenditures.  While manual review of transactions is time-consuming, the 
market research is required, and its return on investment is high.  A high frequency 
of non-CLIN purchases in similar service areas indicates a focus area for items to 
include in future contract negotiations.  Contracting officers have no cue to include 
these items in future HSCs or to incentivize their performance if there is no tracking 
of frequency and cost impact.  Furthermore, a high percentage of non-CLIN 
expenditures represents a significant shift in risk from the contractor to the 
government because non-CLIN services are reimbursable while CLIN services are 
FFP.  Hence, a high number of non-CLIN expenditures offer potential for significant 
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H. HIGH REQUIREMENTS VARIABILITY 
In the eyes of some contracting officers, the greatest challenge in husbanding 
services contracting is, “contracting for a service where frequently changing port-visit 
patterns and uncertainty drive contractors to incorporate contingencies into their 
pricing” (Parker, 2006, January 25).  Whereas the commercial husbanding model is 
based on predictability and long-standing agency relationships, U.S. Navy HSCs are 
subject to high schedule volatility and the additional constraints of Federal 
Acquisition Regulations.  Port schedules of Navy ships are classified, and HSPs 
generally have three to seven days’ advance notice of a port visit.   
In accounting for this volatility and its associated risk, it is important to 
distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable sources of variability.  While 
contracting officers may have no control or knowledge of short-notice schedule 
changes or contingencies that will cause spikes in demand for services, they can 
affect variability in the types of services included in a husbanding services contract 
and in the volume of billing transactions.  For example, contractor contingency 
pricing can be minimized by segregating services with higher volatility into separate 
contracts.  Commonly used service items with relatively constant demand represent 
a lower risk to the contractor under a fixed-price arrangement.  Conversely, highly 
variable service capabilities such as OOTW require HSPs to hold capabilities or 
assets in reserve in anticipation of demand spikes.  HSPs can be expected to factor 
both opportunity cost and uncertainty into their pricing.   
I. LACK OF CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES 
A working premise of this study is that because performance is paramount to 
operational customers, incentives are a critical element of HSCs.  Not only does 
FAR 37.102 require the use of performance-based acquisition, numerous key 
evaluation factors such as Anti-terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) considerations 
and schedule constraints call for maximum incentives linking HSP performance to 
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Highly variable and demanding performance requirements present cost risk to 
contractors under a fixed-price arrangement.  Current HSC practice, which allows for 
cost reimbursement of non-CLIN items, incentivizes contractors to allow contracting 
officers to continue in ignorance when negotiating contracts that do not include all 
required and/or reasonably anticipated CLIN items.   The contractor can then 
engage in unbalanced pricing when ships require the non-CLIN items and must pay 
for them at “cost”.  A common tactic involves modifying a service (e.g., by “tailoring” 
it to a specific user) until it no longer meets the definition of the negotiated CLIN.  
The service then becomes cost-reimbursable.  This practice shifts risk off the HSP 
by changing the contract structure for non-CLIN items from the intended firm-fixed-
price to cost-plus-fixed fee (CPFF)—non-CLIN service at cost, plus the HSP daily 
fee.  Contracting officers need both accurate forecasting tools and contracting 
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
A. PROJECT LOGIC FLOW  
 
Figure 8.   Logical Flow of Contracting Methodology Evaluation 
Figure 8 summarizes the project’s methodological flow.  The overarching goal 
of husbanding services contracting is to satisfy user needs within existing 
constraints.  The husbanding services acquisition environment includes a spectrum 
of contracting practices that vary with user requirements and context.  When the “as-
is” state of HSC practice is compared to the desired state, numerous contracting 
issues arise from the differing states.  The researchers relied heavily on the use of 
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contracts to perform this comparison, as literature on the topic of husbanding 
services contracting is minimal.   
Next in approach was a review of the contracting vehicles that were 
allowable, feasible, and appropriate tools to address existing HSC issues.  The 
forecasting and simulation model described below is a tool that management 
personnel may use when making best-value decisions or evaluating contracting 
methodologies.  The model analyzes historical port-visit cost and frequency data.   
Application of SWOT analysis to the FISC contracting organization focuses 
management and helps to develop a standardized HSC policy.  Model stochastics 
combine with SWOT analysis focal areas and stakeholder priorities to form the basis 
of a recommended mix of policy characteristics.  The goal of these analyses was to 
develop a targeted, risk-based HSC policy.  Accordingly, the project output is 
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B. MODELING DESCRIPTION  
 
Figure 9.   Modeling Algorithm 
Module 1 — The frequency of port-visits is found using the following 
steps: 
a. The raw data, including the frequency of visits for each port, was 
downloaded from “WEBCRAFT” official website by using “Port-visit 
Listing” link.  
b. The downloaded data was imported to a Microsoft Excel™ file.  
c. “DAVERAGE” and “DSTDEV” functions were used to figure out the 
average and standard deviation of port visits for each class of ship 
type. 
d. The ports selected as representative samples are: 
i. Dubai 
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v. Valletta 
vi. Souda Bay 
vii. Augusta Bay 
viii. Palma de Mallorca  
  Statistics for these ports are listed in Appendix 3. 
Modules 2 & 3 — The average cost per ship class and per visit is 
determined by: 
a. The raw data,  including the costs per visit for each port, was 
downloaded from “WEBCRAFT” official website by using “Detailed 
Services” link.  
b. The downloaded data was imported to a Microsoft Excel™ file. 
c. “DAVERAGE” and “DSTDEV” functions were used to figure out the 
average cost, standard deviation of cost, average service-usage 
rate, and standard deviation of service usage rate for each class of 
ship type at each port. 








e. Common services chosen as representative are: 
i. CHT 
ii. Potable Water 
iii. Trash Removal 
iv. Vehicles/Car Rental 
v. Bus Service 
vi. Cell Phones 
vii. FP, Barrier 









xii. Husbanding Service Fees 
Average service-usage rates and standard deviations are listed in Appendix 4. 
Modules 4 & 5 — Annual cost and service usage are simulated using Crystal 
Ball™. Each iteration of the simulation proceeds as follows: 
a. According to the central limit theorem, the decision variables below 
are assumed to be normally distributed.  Therefore, when defining 
these variables in Crystal Ball™, each is designated as normal:  
i. Average cost and standard deviation of cost per port-visit. 
ii. Average service usage rate and standard deviation of 
service usage rate per port-visit. 
iii. Average port-visit and standard deviation of port-visit. 
b. After identifying all decision variables, reliability is maximized by 
iterating the simulation 10,000 times using a 95% confidence 
interval. 
c. The mathematical functions used in the simulation are as follows: 
   Annual Total Cost = VDij * CDklm 
   Annual Service Usage = VDij * QDtsz 
   VDij = Total number of visit of port i for ship type j 
   CDklm = Service type m`s cost of port l for ship type k 
   QDtsz = Service z`s usage rate of port s for ship type t 
       j,k,t = The same ship types mentioned in module 2&3 
   l,i,s = The same ports mentioned in module 1 
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Advantages of Simulation 
a. Modules 4 & 5 use Crystal Ball™ simulation program. This software 
allows the user to simulate the annual port-visits of ships and 
service usage of these ships at the ports by using the data between 
2001 and 2006.  
b. All simulation is based on historical data from 2001 to 2006. This 
assures a high confidence in the result of the simulation.  
c. At the end of the simulation, the user is presented results in user-
defined format: 
1. Annual expected total cost 
2. Annual expected cost per port 
3. Annual expected usage rate of any given service type 
4. Annual expected usage rate of any given service type in any 
port  
d. Crystal Ball™ provides many tools, such as statistical analysis, 
sensitivity analysis, and graphical distribution charts for the user to 
analyze simulation results. 
e. Crystal Ball™ allows up to 10,000 iterations as part of the 
simulation. Therefore, it offers a confidence factor in the results 
several orders of magnitude higher than traditional, single-iteration 
software.    
Output—Phase 1 outputs provide the user with the following information: 
a. Market research information to be used as a basis for negotiating 
future husbanding contracts. 
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V. ANALYSIS   
A. SIGNIFICANT DATA POINTS 
Historical port-visit cost and frequency data included in Appendices 1 and 2, 
along with the forecasting and simulation results included in Appendices 3 and 4, 
reveal numerous focus areas for management attention.   
1. Forecasted Port-visit Frequency 
A high frequency of visits to a given port, coupled with a high volume of 
metered services, indicates a potential opportunity for port tariff negotiations.  In 
these situations, even a small negotiated price reduction can yield considerable 
returns for the effort.  Historical data in Appendix 2 indicate such a focus area within 
the 5th Fleet AOR.  The ports of Mina Sulman and Jebel Ali combine to account for 
62% of port-visits and 76% of port-visit costs in BY 2006.  
Scheduling port-visits, where possible, to a narrow range of ports allows 
planners to narrow the range of requirements and reduce the number of services 
unique to a given port.  Reduced variability and a higher frequency of visits to a 
given port allow more accurate cost forecasting.  In general, the data in Appendix 3 
illustrate the extremely high variability in port-visit frequency that results from 
unpredictable schedules.  Recall that, while variability resulting from unpredictable 
operational schedules is an unknown when negotiating a HSC, variability in the 
range of services required can be influenced and managed.   
2. Forecasted Port-visit Cost 
Forecasted port-visit costs provide management information such as: 
Information to support port-visit location decisions.  In comparing the 
port-visit costs of Mina Sulman and Jebel Ali (Appendix 2), for 
example, we see that port costs in Jebel Ali were $3,890,452.04 
for 345 days in port, while port costs in Mina Sulman were 
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average daily cost for a visit to Mina Sulman is 25.7% of the 
$11,276.67/day cost of visiting Jebel Ali.  
Financial forecasting information.  The confidence interval results in 
Appendix 4 enable budgeting and management of cost risk based 
on probability.  Levels of confidence can be adjusted to 
management preferences.   
Baseline ranges for negotiation of follow-on contracts.  Port-cost 
information can be factored with the port-visit frequency 
information above to arrive at a target range to be used when 
entering negotiations for follow-on HSCs.    
3. Cost by Service 
Detailed services cost data provide management information such as: 
Reference prices for services.  The services cost breakdown included in 
Appendix 1 is an example of management information that can be 
used for comparison by a contracting officer when making a fair-
and-reasonable determination. 
Sensitivity analysis for requirements versus cost decisions.  For 
example, based on the services cost data in Appendix 4, a policy 
adding ATFP requirements for force protection barriers can be 
expected to add approximately $4400/day to the port-visit costs.   
Focus areas for port tariff rate negotiations.  For example, the services 
data in Appendix 1 show that the top 4 metered services of shore 
power, CHT, bilge water removal, and potable water accounted for 
42.7% of Bahrain port expenses.   
Management of cost risk.  High frequency usage of a particular non-CLIN 
service serves as a cue to include that service in follow-on HSCs.   
4. Estimated vs. Actual Port-visit Cost 
A large difference between estimated and actual port-visit costs indicates a 
need for increased management attention.  For example, the BY 2006 actual 
expenses of $22,944,131.87 described in Appendix 1 are 229% of the $10,000,000 
forecast amount for the 5th Fleet HSC (Couture, 2007, March 24).  The magnitude of 
the forecast error reveals a need for both improved forecasting and cost-analysis 
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5. CLIN vs. Non-CLIN Services 
As described above, a high percentage of non-CLIN services increases both 
variability and risk to the government.  A high number of non-CLIN services required 
by end-users may also be indicative of inadequate requirements definition and/or 
low level of standardization.  The data in Appendix 1 show that non-CLIN services of 
$12,150,612.66 made up 53.2% of $22,837,064.98 in total port costs for BY 2006.  
For this data set, 53.2% of port costs were reimbursed at cost using a HSC 
characterized as “fixed-price.”  
B. SWOT ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 10.   SWOT Analysis Framework 
Using the SWOT analysis framework in Figure 10 and the NAVSUP field 
contracting organization as a point of reference, several potential focus areas have 
been identified as relevant when formulating a husbanding services contracting 
developmental approach.  Developing organizational performance often begins with 
policy changes derived from objective assessments, resulting in incremental 








 Bargaining power in contract negotiations 
 Ability to both positively and negatively incentivize performance 
 Audit and reject capabilities of unreasonable items 
 Mature infrastructure capable of offering support to other services in 
the event of a contingency 
 Leverage of maintaining forward logistics capability without permanent 
presence 
Weaknesses: 
 Lack of market research data to support decisions 
 Security requirements and constraints 
 Requirement to maintain standing OOTW response capability 
 HSPs have superior spend analysis data and commercial software 
applications 
 Highly volatile schedule requirements 
 Relatively inefficient billing and payment processes  
 High government regulatory and oversight requirements 
 Widely varying stakeholder practices/processes 
2. Future 
Opportunities: 
 High competition among HSPs creates leverage 
 Regionalization of HSCs leads to higher contract values that attract 
HSPs from the commercial sector 
 A single, worldwide field contracting directorate offers an opportunity to 
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 Centralized storage of port-cost data enables a targeted port-visit 
approach based on forecast port-visit costs 
Threats: 
 Inability to track and anticipate non-CLIN services increases cost risk 
 Schedule delays while resolving disputed item charges 
 Lack of cost visibility by operational units leads to poor purchasing 
decisions  
 Lower variability and higher profit margin commercial contracts draw 
HSP resources away from Government contracts.  
 Wide geography and port-cost variation raises both cost and 
performance risk 
 Current HSC structure inadequately incentivizes HSP performance 
(e.g., unknown levels of service required and unknown OOTW 
requirements) 
3. Strategic Focus Areas 
Having explored both current and desired states of husbanding services 
contracting, SWOT analysis draws attention to the means or options for bridging 
gaps.  Based on the logic of this framework, NAVSUP would seek to exploit 
opportunities using its strengths and to avoid or prepare for potential threats.  
Preference would likely be given to incentivizing the paramount goals of 
performance and flexibility—while considering tradeoffs in other areas as required.  
When considering NAVSUP goals within the SWOT framework, the following 
strategic focus areas are identified:  
 Since better information leads to better business decisions, NAVSUP 
can  leverage its ability to incentivize performance (strength) to 
overcome its lack of market data to support decisions (weakness) and 
to counter the threat of inadequate HSP incentives in the current 
contracting environment.   
 NAVSUP can use its strength in bargaining power to exploit the 
opportunity of increased market competition and to negotiate contracts 
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 Formation of a worldwide field contracting directorate presents an 
opportunity to standardize policy and processes.  Standardization, in 
turn, facilitates integration and reinforces the ability to offer 
contingency support to other services.  Integration also increases 
visibility of knowledge and resources (see above).  The opportunity of 
centralization might also be used to overcome widely varying 
stakeholder practices (weakness).   
 Many of NAVSUP’s weaknesses include areas where they have little to 
no control (e.g., security constraints, OOTW constraints, and volatile 
schedule requirements).  Therefore, they can take advantage of 
regionalization opportunities and explore ways to streamline  
processes.  Streamlining can focus on reducing variability (both a 
threat and a weakness) and increasing flexibility (a key performance 
goal). 
 NAVSUP ability to incentivize (strength) can be used to confront the 
threats of increased cost risk posed by non-CLIN services and poor 
purchasing decisions—both resulting from lack of cost visibility.  The 
incentive would be tied to the performance metric of increased 
visibility.   
Although risk cannot be eliminated, it can be assessed and managed.  The 
risk of port-cost variation (threat) can be confronted using a targeted, risk-based 
approach to scheduling port-visits.  Centralized port-cost data and increased visibility 
of port-cost data enable risk-based contracting approaches based on probabilities 
and historical data.  
C. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Decision-making authority in the U.S. acquisition system is diffuse—
emphasizing the need for stakeholder analysis.  Stakeholder analysis adds to 
strategic focus by prioritizing stakeholders, identifying their interests, and attempting 
to garner their support.  Aligning stakeholder claims with acquisition goals where 
possible makes business sense, whereas lack of alignment means some needs and 
expectations are not being met.  Potential barriers to implementing policy can be 
incorporated into the SWOT analysis weaknesses or threats.  While SWOT analysis 
identifies strategic focus areas, stakeholder analysis attempts to align and prioritize 
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definitive and dominant stakeholders would need to be identified, prioritized, and 
addressed or the organization faces irrelevance—the equivalent of bankruptcy in the 
private sector.  Flexibility, empathy, and political savvy are required to understand 
the needs and expectations of a plurality of stakeholders—particularly in changing 
global environments.     
Stakeholder attributes determine their class and potential impact on the focal 
organization.  Figure 11 summarizes stakeholders and their corresponding 
attributes, classes, and interests in the husbanding services contracting process.   
 
Figure 11.   HSC Stakeholders 
Based on identified attributes and classes, NAVSUP, the combatant 
commanders, and the fleet forces commands are definitive stakeholders having 
substantial potential to impact HSC policy.  NAVSUP’s stated mission is to provide 
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NAVSUP has the power to implement HSC policy, legitimate claims on all 
husbanding contract issues, and to play a critical management role in HSC.  
Combatant commanders possess legitimate power and urgency apparently 
commensurate with their responsibility for operations.  The operational commander’s 
bottom line includes economics and personnel accountability, but performance is 
often viewed through the eyes of all stakeholders.  This definitive stakeholder is 
willing to trade off all interest areas (within constraints) for schedule and 
performance factors.  Commander Fleet Forces Command possesses power, 
legitimacy, and urgency by virtue of its mission to man, train, and equip the 
operational commanders.  The Command’s primary interest area is to perform its 
support role within budget and security constraints.  The definitive stakeholders 
share the interest areas of cost tracking, ATFP, and financial forecasting.  
The common interest areas of service quality and payment issues emerge 
when the subset of dominant stakeholders is added.  CNI exercises utilitarian power 
and legitimacy when performing its stated mission: “Overall shore installation 
management and authority as budget submitting office for installation support and 
the Navy point of contact for installation policy and program execution oversight.”  
FISC field contracting offices possess both legitimacy and urgency commensurate 
with their responsibility to solicit, award, and administer husbanding services 
contracts.  
The following interest areas are common to all definitive and dominant 
stakeholders and can be incorporated into performance parameters, constraints, or 
incentivized items in a HSC methodology: 
 Anti-terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) mandates 
 Improved port-cost tracking 
 Improved financial forecasting 
 Service quality 
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High-priority interest areas should be appropriately weighted in incentive 
arrangements.  For example, a low-frequency, high-variability service such as 
contingency CLINs will require a higher incentive to induce the required level of 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS  
A. BASE CONTRACT TYPE ON REALISTIC RISK 
ASSESSMENTS 
Contract type is determined by the certainty of requirements and the level of 
cost risk.  Clear and definitive requirements allow the government to assign the 
contract risk to the contractor using a firm-fixed-price arrangement for specific levels 
of performance.  Competition drives prices to a level commensurate with risk.  
Hence, there are trade-offs among risk, cost, and appropriate contract type.  To 
eliminate risk would be cost-prohibitive.  It must, instead, be managed by gaining a 
higher probability estimate of future requirements.  Greater uncertainty requires the 
government to either assume greater risk or to pay a premium for the contractor to 
assume risk.  In the case of husbanding services contracts, variability is high, and 
performance requirements are numerable.  Therefore, contractor risk may be 
unacceptable under a FFP agreement—forcing the government to manage risk by 
shifting contract type to either an incentive- or cost-type contract.  Since cost-type 
contracts are least preferable to the government, and high levels of performance risk 
are unacceptable, incentive- or award-fee contract types are appropriate contract 
types for the situation.   
B. TRADE OFF CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN CONSTRAINTS 
Trade-offs are required when performance goals are contradictory (e.g. 
higher performance levels and lower costs).  Not only do some contracting goals 
represent trade-offs, but the priorities for each goal may represent trade-offs among 
stakeholders.  Trade-off criteria may be subjective, but are a pressing reality within 
the existing environment.  Return on investment (ROI) can be measured in dollars 
and in subjective terms such as “performance,” “quality,” and “opportunity cost.”  In 
any dynamic environment, particularly cross-cultural, values, constraints, and 
priorities change with time—giving rise to a central axiom termed flexibility.  Greater 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 56- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
performance in the provision of large-scale services suffers from the generalized 
difficulty of judging good service.  The award-fee contracting tool is a flexible 
incentive mechanism awarded based on subjective value criteria.  The trade-off for 
increased flexibility and incentive is increased administrative cost.  In terms of 
husbanding services contracting ROI, the award-fee costs in time and money are 
compared to future reduction in negotiated contract rates, reduced variability, or 
enhanced schedule performance (all depend on the incentive evaluation criteria 
assigned).  In accordance with FAR 16.202-1, the contract award type remains firm-
fixed-price when used with award fee incentives.   Figure 12 illustrates the trade-offs 
of an award-fee incentive arrangement.   
 
Figure 12.   FPAF Characteristic Trade-offs 
C. STREAMLINE EXISTING PRACTICE 
Process improvement can garner efficiencies such as reduced workload and 
reduced variability.  For example, simplified billing procedures reduce errors and the 
consequent man-hours required to track and correct the errors.  John Couture, OIC 
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(GPC) transaction submitted in lieu of DD Form 1155 saves over three hours in 
administrative processing effort (Couture, 2007, March 24).  Another method of 
avoiding administrative tracking effort caused by incomplete or inaccurate billing is to 
delay payment until final port-cost totals are known.  Figure 13 demonstrates the 
complexity and potential sources of delay in payment processing.   
Use of the government purchase card (GPC) would bypass much of the 
complex billing process and support distance support initiatives that reduce workload 
for operational units—particularly those without a disbursing office on board.   
Finally, if GPC use were standardized and mandated, the commercial tracking and 
visibility of the GPC administrator’s software system could be leveraged to gather 
and track port-cost expenditures.  Much like using a credit card statement to track 
business expenses, port-visit costs and categories could be tracked and become 
available for forecasting future expenses.  A potentially higher volume of 
Government business with the GPC administrator would incentivize him/her to add 
additional classification data fields, such as CLIN and OOTW information, to billing 
reports.  The two percent surcharge is a worthwhile trade-off for improved spending 
visibility and reduced administrative effort.  Government purchase card statistics 
from a recent DASN Acquisition Management presentation show only 780 infractions 
out of 1.4 million GPC transactions during the latter half of fiscal year 2005 (Brown, 
2007, April 5).  These data, along with a significant downward trend in GPC 
infractions show that the risk of adopting this payment method is minuscule when 
compared to the potential benefits.   
Grouping similar CLINs is another billing practice that would reduce the 
volume of transactions.  While the total amount due would not change, the number 
of invoices and vouchers would decrease—along with the probability of errors and 
administrative efforts required to correct the errors.  Grouping similar CLINs (e.g., by 
similar fund codes) would simplify the gathering of management data and facilitate 
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Figure 13.   FISCSI Detachment Bahrain Billing Flowchart 
From (Morgan, 2007, March 24) 
D. STANDARDIZE, INTEGRATE, AND INCREASE VISIBILITY 
Major benefits of standardization include the ability to process and filter cost 
data and the ability to share cost data among organizations.  Integration and 
increased visibility are corollaries of standardization.  For example, standardization 
of data entry might include a specific data field for CLIN number.  ADP equipment 
could then determine the frequency of that CLIN’s usage.  Furthermore, searching a 
database for non-CLIN items would reveal spend data for items required, but not 
included in the HSC at a negotiated, fixed-price.  The current CRAFT database has 
no way of identifying non-CLIN items other than manual review of the remarks field.    
CLINs could also be assigned to standardized groups of high-use items.  The 
standardized group of items or services would limit variability and enable volume 
efficiencies when purchasing.  For example, ATFP packages standardized to ship 
type, plus upgrade modules for escalating threat conditions would reduce volume, 
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Finally, standardized data fields are amenable to information technology (IT) 
applications that reduce workload for operational customers.  IT applications also 
increase the ability of acquisition personnel to conduct market research.  Demand 
data included with spend analysis data also aid supply-chain personnel.     
E. INCENTIVIZE HSP’S TO MEET PERFORMANCE 
OBJECTIVES 
A risk-based contracting approach is necessary given the ubiquitous scarcity 
of resources.  Reduced requirements variability minimizes cost and performance 
risk.  Improved tracking and spend analysis of services allows higher accuracy in 
requirements prediction.  Detailed spend analysis is prevalent in commercial 
contracting—and should be achievable in military HSCs if properly incentivized.  
Performance is paramount for all of the reasons cited above.  Therefore, HSCs 
should incentivize performance areas such as: 
 Data collection, visibility, and accuracy (e.g., HSP provides spend 
analysis segregated by CLIN, non-CLIN, OOTW, etc. in return for an 
award fee). 
 Demonstrated cost avoidance (e.g., HSP negotiates a port tariff 
reduction for USN and is awarded X% of the savings realized by the 
new, negotiated rate).  
Price variability and risk reduction (e.g., HSP reduces the percentage of non-
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RECOMMENDED HUSBANDING CONTRACT POLICY 
1. Characteristics 
Implementation of a flat-rate, low-variability, well-defined and constant set of 
requirements minimizes risk and price fluctuations.  Conversely, adoption of a cost 
reimbursable contract type is both undesirable and infeasible.  A contracting 
methodology that represents a best value trade-off within constraints should have 
the following characteristics: 
a. Flexible 
 Recommended tool for implementation: IDIQ task order 
 Recommended tool for implementation: Award-fee criteria 
b. Risk-based 
 Recommended tool for implementation: Risk-based, “targeted port 
approach” based on probability and port-cost data 
 Recommended tool for implementation: Market research modeling to 
inform business decisions 
 Recommended tool for implementation: Focus risk management and 
oversight on high-ROI process improvements 
 Recommended tool for implementation: Isolate high-variability services 
where practicable 
c. Performance-based Incentives 
 Recommended tool for implementation: FPAF contract type 
 Recommended tool for implementation: Sharing cost savings achieved 
through contractor demonstrated cost avoidance efforts. 
 Recommended tool for implementation: Award fee plan that can be 
modified as environment, goals, priorities change.  A notional award 
fee plan and award fee evaluation scale are outlined below as Figures 
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Figure 14.   Notional Award Fee Evaluation Scale 
 
Figure 15.   Recommended HSC Policy Structure 
Splitting HSCs into separate IDIQ task orders is part of an overarching, risk-
based approach intended to isolate uncontrollable sources of volatility.  While it may 
be intuitive to apply the award-fee incentive to the highly-variable IDIQ task order, it 
is important to focus incentives on the higher-volume performance areas that can be 
more extensively influenced by policy.  Incentive application to a larger proportion of 
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and risk.   Figure 15 outlines the structure and elements of a recommended 
husbanding services contracting policy.  Major elements are described below: 
2. Elements 
a. IDIQ Task Order (1) 
i. Low-frequency, high-variability services 
ii. FFP CLINs for predictable requirements common to most OOTW, 
submarine rescue, and exercises  
iii. Price reimbursable non-CLIN services + daily fee (due to unknown 
level of service requirements) 
iv. Annual contract term with government option to extend (lowers 
contractor exposure to risk + maintains immediate performance 
incentive) 
v. Highly unpredictable services isolated into a separate contract 
vi. Anticipate a high percentage of non-CLIN services 
b. IDIQ Task Order (2) 
i. High-frequency, lower-variability services 
ii. Standardized bundle of ATFP services negotiated as a single CLIN per 
ship type + CLIN module upgrades for escalating THREATCON + 
location-specific services  
iii. Negotiated “favored” port tariff rates for high volume and/or frequency 
port locations.  Performance incentive = sharing of demonstrated cost 
avoidance. 
iv. FFP per unit of service arrangement for negotiated CLIN items 
v. Price reimbursement for non-standard and required non-CLIN  
services.   
a. HSP must provide (semiannually) an itemized breakdown and 
statistical summary of all non-CLIN items provided.   
b. If no price data are available to support the vendor’s quoted 
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c. GPC is the required payment method for non-CLIN items under 
the micro-purchase threshold (may require policy coordination 
with other GPC issuing authorities).   
vi. Maximizes the “market basket” approach, but offers an award-fee 
incentive to increase visibility and sharing of cost data, and 
minimization of non-CLIN service requirements  
vii. Yearly award term with yearly renewal options.  
B. SCOPE FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
A critical consideration for the policy scope is the trade-off between 
performance and administrative burden.  The larger in scope a contract becomes, 
the more meaningful management skill becomes to successful performance.  Since 
local knowledge, licenses, and business contacts are critical to successful 
performance, husbanding service providers must increasingly rely on subcontractors 
as contract scope increases.  As contract scope increases, the number of 
subcontracting levels tends to increase while the visibility of lower level 
subcontractor actions decreases.  With a regional contract scope, the core 
competencies of the primary contractor become integration, coordination, and 
stakeholder management.     
Benefits of increased contract scope include shared resource reserves, 
centralized management data, and administrative efficiency improvements.  
Contractors awarded large-scope husbanding contracts must have effective 
financing, infrastructure, and coordination capabilities to meet large-scope 
performance objectives.  Extensive coordination and infrastructure assets make 
these contractors more likely to succeed at contingency tasking.  A larger scope of 
contract also allows contractors to more evenly distribute the high variability of 
service levels required among specific locations.  Reserve assets and the ability to 
manage variability, in turn, lower contractor risk and the need for contingency 
pricing.  Finally, the management data and spend analysis required for contractors 
to coordinate large-scope contracts is a potential resource for the Government.  
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performance can be used to persuade contractors to share this market research 
data with government acquisition officials as part of the negotiated contract terms. 
Based on these considerations, a regional scope of contract award is 
recommended.  A worldwide contract scope would unacceptably limit competition 
and the range of responsible bidders.  Numerous local contracts would unacceptably 
increase the volume of contract administration.  A regional contract scope aligns with 
current FISC regional structure.  Geographic regions also provide a logical grouping 
of port-visit locations.  A smaller number of regional scope contracts also reduces 
the potential burden of administering numerous incentive and award fee programs.  
A regional contract scope consolidates administrative effort and cost sufficiently to 
satisfy the FAR 16.404(b) (1) stipulation that award-fee arrangements shall not be 
used unless, “The administrative cost of conducting award-fee evaluations are not 
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VIII. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
A. Detailed spend analysis of OOTW and non-CLIN services 
B. Cost-benefit analysis of port tariff rate negotiations for high-usage ports 
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APPENDIX 1.  SERVICES EXPENSE DATA 
DOLLARS PERCENTAGEService
BY06 TOTAL SPEND $22,837,064.98 100.00%
BYO6 NON CLIN SPEND $12,150,612.66 53.21%
Non Clin Breakdown $2,195,170.65 9.61% Miscellaneous
$1,094,096.89 4.79%
Shore Electrical (consists mostly of 
300 and 400 amp)
$1,024,106.84 4.48%
Port Charges Other (Consists 
mostly of Garbage Can cleaning in 
Mina Sulman)
$895,397.58 3.92% Fuel - MGO
$607,230.40 2.66% Car Rental - Passenger Van
$589,572.53 2.58% FP Other
$570,150.00 2.50% Bilge Water Removal
$446,910.22 1.96% Crew Repatriation
$438,557.30 1.92% Crane Service - Shore
$350,835.10 1.54% Boat Other
$274,693.00 1.20% CHT Removal Pierside
$255,339.16 1.12% Tugs Stand Bye
$224,730.00 0.98% Crane Service - Manlift
$186,180.38 0.82% Potable Water
$166,689.00 0.73% Bus Service
$115,856.00 0.51% Barge - Other and Landing
$108,800.00 0.48% Camels
$108,674.16 0.48% Tugs In
$86,071.50 0.38% Tugs Out
$79,524.00 0.35% Crane Service - Floating
$68,866.67 0.30% Tugs
Subtotal $9,887,451.38 43.30%
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X111AD $246,126.50 1.08% CAR RENTAL - PASSENGER VAN
X211AB $175,220.00 0.77% CAR RENTAL - PASSENGER VAN
X111AC $158,792.50 0.70% CAR RENTAL - SEDAN
X211AC $174,676.00 0.76% CAR RENTAL - SEDAN
X104AA $532,143.86 2.33% CHT REMOVAL - PIERSIDE
X204AB $592,870.00 2.60% CHT REMOVAL - PIERSIDE
X204AE $117,499.50 0.51% CHT REMOVAL - PIERSIDE
X232AB $108,717.50 0.48% CRANE SERVICE - MANLIFT
X134AC $87,498.88 0.38% CRANE SERVICE - SHORE
X105AB $82,028.00 0.36% FENDERS
X205AA $247,296.00 1.08% FENDERS
X205AB $102,504.00 0.45% FENDERS
X133AA $146,651.66 0.64% FORKLIFT SERVICE
X146: $302,570.00 1.32% FP, PIER LIGHTING
X202AA $136,045.00 0.60% HUSBANDING SVCS SUBSEQ DAY
X130AF $329,671.25 1.44% PORT CHARGES - OTHER
X130BA $156,976.59 0.69% PORT CHARGES - OTHER
X138AA $200,425.00 0.88% PORTABLE TOILETS
X235AD $388,090.00 1.70% SHORE/ELECTRICAL POWER
X235AE $600,127.00 2.63% SHORE/ELECTRICAL POWER
X130AJ $338,439.38 1.48% TRASH REMOVAL - PIERSIDE
X203AA $89,422.40 0.39% TRASH REMOVAL - PIERSIDE
X108AA $188,268.46 0.82% TUGS - IN
X108AE $173,418.97 0.76% TUGS - IN
X208AA $70,755.00 0.31% TUGS - IN
X108AA $182,465.01 0.80% TUGS - OUT
X108AE $164,645.66 0.72% TUGS - OUT
X208AA $70,755.00 0.31% TUGS - OUT
X208AB $328,331.57 1.44% TUGS - STAND-BY
X130AH $53,656.21 0.23% WATER, POTABLE - PIERSIDE
X206AA $107,250.99 0.47% WATER, POTABLE - PIERSIDE
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APPENDIX 2.  PORT-VISIT EXPENSE DATA 
Port Dollar Value Visits
Days in 
Port Percentage%
MINA SULMAN $9,427,558.87 267 2,750 41.09%
JEBEL ALI $8,038,959.93 137 650 35.04%
FUJAIRAH $2,197,238.88 74 98 9.58%
AQABA $912,024.08 8 24 3.97%
RAS AL JULIAH $634,440.50 49 55 2.77%
SEYCHELLES $512,373.93 11 51 2.23%
PORT SULTAN 
QABOOS, MUSCAT $257,264.76 7 43 1.12%
DJIBOUTI $211,225.38 11 22 0.92%
KARACHI $189,995.84 4 6 0.83%
DUBAI $133,113.90 6 306 0.58%
SITRA ANCHORAGE $112,481.22 3 6 0.49%
SAO TOME $89,908.12 3 9 0.39%
MANAMA $63,043.45 1 5 0.27%
PORT SUEZ $60,872.55 57 92 0.27%
TAKORADI $55,065.00 1 2 0.24%
DOHA $31,910.00 2 42 0.14%
SALALAH PORT, 
SALALAH $12,139.20 4 8 0.05%
SHUAIBA $3,497.23 1 1 0.02%
PALMEIRA BAY $1,019.03 1 1 0.00%





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 76- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=




L POWER $2,277,970.38 24.16%
MISCELLANEOUS $900,592.33 9.55%
CHT REMOVAL - 
PIERSIDE $764,810.38 8.11%
CAR RENTAL - 
PASSENGER VAN $633,001.00 6.71%
BILGE WATER 
REMOVAL $570,150.00 6.05%
TUGS - STAND-BY $562,040.76 5.96%
PORT CHARGES - 
OTHER $421,991.16 4.48%
WATER, POTABLE - 
PIERSIDE $413,445.99 4.39%
FENDERS $371,136.00 3.94%
BOAT, OTHER $341,948.10 3.63%
CRANE SERVICE - 
SHORE $263,886.08 2.80%
CAR RENTAL - 
SEDAN $185,156.00 1.96%
HUSBANDING SVCS 
SUBSEQ DAY $165,175.00 1.75%
CRANE SERVICE - 
MANLIFT $134,590.50 1.43%
TUGS - OUT $107,325.00 1.14%
TUGS - IN $106,927.50 1.13%
CRANE SERVICE - 
FLOATING $105,547.00 1.12%
TRASH REMOVAL - 
PIERSIDE $92,230.40 0.98%
WATER, POTABLE - 
ANCHORAGE $91,207.21 0.97%
TUGS $81,859.47 0.87%
CHT REMOVAL - 
ANCHORAGE $75,450.00 0.80%
FORKLIFT SERVICE $60,248.00 0.64%
BROWS $56,715.00 0.60%
BARGE, LANDING $49,824.00 0.53%
PAINT FLOAT $43,700.00 0.46%
WASTE OIL - 
ANCHORAGE $43,680.00 0.46%
TELEPHONE - 
CELLULAR USAGE $40,847.50 0.43%
WASTE OIL - 
PIERSIDE $38,693.59 0.41%
PILOTS - OUT $31,376.00 0.33%
HUSBANDING SVC 
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TRASH REMOVAL - 
ANCHORAGE $25,344.00 0.27%




PORTABLE TOILETS $23,175.00 0.25%
BARGE, OTHER $21,900.00 0.23%




WATER, FEED - 
PIERSIDE $16,303.50 0.17%
LAUNDRY & DRY 
CLEANING SVCS $16,291.15 0.17%
WATER TAXI SVC - 
OUTER HARBOR $10,800.00 0.11%
FP, GUARD SHACK, 
WEATHER 
RESISTANT $10,175.00 0.11%
ANCHORAGE FEE $8,981.71 0.10%
FLEET LANDING 
EXPENSES $8,590.00 0.09%





GUARDS, ARMED $6,160.00 0.07%
WATER, FEED - 
ANCHORAGE $5,927.50 0.06%
PILOTS $4,028.00 0.04%
BARGE, STERN $3,350.00 0.04%
CAMELS $2,650.00 0.03%
CAR RENTAL - 
DRIVER ONLY $2,000.00 0.02%










PILOTS - BERTHING 
SHIFTS $636.00 0.01%
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APPENDIX 3.  FORECAST PORT-VISIT FREQUENCY 
DATA 







02_03 24 MANAMA DDG 03_04 11 MANAMA DDG 04_05 3 MANAMA DDG 05_06 0 DDG 11 9.87
02_03 8 MANAMA FFG 03_04 1 MANAMA FFG 04_05 3 MANAMA FFG 05_06 0 FFG 3.6 3.36
02_03 18 MANAMA CG 03_04 16 MANAMA CG 04_05 6 MANAMA CG 05_06 1 CG 11.8 7.82
02_03 4 MANAMA CVN 03_04 5 MANAMA CVN 04_05 6 MANAMA CVN 05_06 0 CVN 3.4 2.41
02_03 18 MANAMA LSD 03_04 6 MANAMA LSD 04_05 4 MANAMA LSD 05_06 0 LSD 6.6 6.77
02_03 5 MANAMA LHD 03_04 1 MANAMA LHD 04_05 3 MANAMA LHD 05_06 0 LHD 2.2 1.92
02_03 8 MANAMA AOE 03_04 4 MANAMA AOE 04_05 2 MANAMA AOE 05_06 0 AOE 3.8 3.03







02_03 3 JEBEL ALI DDG 03_04 11 JEBEL ALI DDG 04_05 13 JEBEL ALI DDG 05_06 13 DDG 8.2 5.76
02_03 2 JEBEL ALI FFG 03_04 0 JEBEL ALI FFG 04_05 2 JEBEL ALI FFG 05_06 2 FFG 1.4 0.89
02_03 4 JEBEL ALI CG 03_04 9 JEBEL ALI CG 04_05 6 JEBEL ALI CG 05_06 10 CG 5.8 4.02
02_03 3 JEBEL ALI CVN 03_04 6 JEBEL ALI CVN 04_05 5 JEBEL ALI CVN 05_06 7 CVN 4.4 2.41
02_03 1 JEBEL ALI LSD 03_04 4 JEBEL ALI LSD 04_05 4 JEBEL ALI LSD 05_06 5 LSD 3 1.87
02_03 2 JEBEL ALI LHD 03_04 2 JEBEL ALI LHD 04_05 5 JEBEL ALI LHD 05_06 1 LHD 2.2 1.64
02_03 34 JEBEL ALI AOE 03_04 21 JEBEL ALI AOE 04_05 24 JEBEL ALI AOE 05_06 14 AOE 20.6 9.32







02_03 0 DUBAI DDG 03_04 2 DUBAI DDG 04_05 0 DUBAI DDG 05_06 0 DDG 0.4 0.89
02_03 0 DUBAI FFG 03_04 0 DUBAI FFG 04_05 0 DUBAI FFG 05_06 0 FFG 0 0.00
02_03 0 DUBAI CG 03_04 2 DUBAI CG 04_05 0 DUBAI CG 05_06 0 CG 0.4 0.89
02_03 0 DUBAI CVN 03_04 0 DUBAI CVN 04_05 0 DUBAI CVN 05_06 0 CVN 0 0.00
02_03 0 DUBAI LSD 03_04 0 DUBAI LSD 04_05 0 DUBAI LSD 05_06 0 LSD 0 0.00
02_03 0 DUBAI LHD 03_04 1 DUBAI LHD 04_05 0 DUBAI LHD 05_06 0 LHD 0.2 0.45
02_03 0 DUBAI AOE 03_04 0 DUBAI AOE 04_05 0 DUBAI AOE 05_06 0 AOE 0 0.00







02_03 5 AKSAZ DDG 03_04 1 AKSAZ DDG 04_05 1 AKSAZ DDG 05_06 2 DDG 3 2.35
02_03 9 AKSAZ FFG 03_04 8 AKSAZ FFG 04_05 1 AKSAZ FFG 05_06 0 FFG 5 4.18
02_03 3 AKSAZ CG 03_04 0 AKSAZ CG 04_05 0 AKSAZ CG 05_06 1 CG 1.4 1.52
02_03 0 AKSAZ CVN 03_04 0 AKSAZ CVN 04_05 0 AKSAZ CVN 05_06 0 CVN 0 0.00
02_03 0 AKSAZ LSD 03_04 0 AKSAZ LSD 04_05 0 AKSAZ LSD 05_06 0 LSD 0.2 0.45
02_03 0 AKSAZ LHD 03_04 0 AKSAZ LHD 04_05 0 AKSAZ LHD 05_06 0 LHD 0.2 0.45
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02_03 8 SOUDA BADDG 03_04 8 SOUDA BAYDDG 04_05 15 SOUDA BAY DDG 05_06 19 DDG 13.2 4.97
  port    port    port     
02_03 12 SOUDA BAFFG 03_04 9 SOUDA BAYFFG 04_05 10 SOUDA BAY FFG 05_06 9 FFG 10 1.22
  port    port    port     
02_03 2 SOUDA BACG 03_04 2 SOUDA BAYCG 04_05 4 SOUDA BAY CG 05_06 1 CG 2.2 1.10
  port    port    port     
02_03 4 SOUDA BACVN 03_04 1 SOUDA BAYCVN 04_05 2 SOUDA BAY CVN 05_06 2 CVN 2.2 1.10
  port    port    port     
02_03 2 SOUDA BALSD 03_04 0 SOUDA BAYLSD 04_05 2 SOUDA BAY LSD 05_06 2 LSD 1.4 0.89
  port    port    port     
02_03 3 SOUDA BALHD 03_04 1 SOUDA BAYLHD 04_05 0 SOUDA BAY LHD 05_06 0 LHD 1.2 1.30
  port    port    port     
02_03 5 SOUDA BAAOE 03_04 1 SOUDA BAYAOE 04_05 0 SOUDA BAY AOE 05_06 1 AOE 2 2.00







02_03 5 AUGUSTA DDG 03_04 5 AUGUSTA B DDG 04_05 7 AUGUSTA BAYDDG 05_06 14 DDG 7.4 3.78
                      
02_03 5 AUGUSTA FFG 03_04 7 AUGUSTA B FFG 04_05 6 AUGUSTA BAYFFG 05_06 0 FFG 4.8 2.77
                      
02_03 2 AUGUSTA CG 03_04 0 AUGUSTA B CG 04_05 2 AUGUSTA BAYCG 05_06 2 CG 1.8 1.10
                      
02_03 1 AUGUSTA CVN 03_04 0 AUGUSTA B CVN 04_05 0 AUGUSTA BAYCVN 05_06 0 CVN 0.2 0.45
                      
02_03 0 AUGUSTA LSD 03_04 0 AUGUSTA B LSD 04_05 1 AUGUSTA BAYLSD 05_06 1 LSD 0.4 0.55
                      
02_03 0 AUGUSTA LHD 03_04 1 AUGUSTA B LHD 04_05 0 AUGUSTA BAYLHD 05_06 0 LHD 0.6 0.89
                      
02_03 14 AUGUSTA AOE 03_04 4 AUGUSTA B AOE 04_05 4 AUGUSTA BAYAOE 05_06 1 AOE 5.6 4.93







02_03 3 PALMA DEDDG 03_04 4 PALMA DE MDDG 04_05 2 PALMA DE MADDG 05_06 2 DDG 2.2 1.48
                      
02_03 3 PALMA DEFFG 03_04 1 PALMA DE MFFG 04_05 2 PALMA DE MAFFG 05_06 0 FFG 1.2 1.30
                      
02_03 2 PALMA DECG 03_04 1 PALMA DE MCG 04_05 0 PALMA DE MACG 05_06 0 CG 0.6 0.89
                      
02_03 0 PALMA DECVN 03_04 2 PALMA DE MCVN 04_05 4 PALMA DE MACVN 05_06 0 CVN 1.2 1.79
                      
02_03 0 PALMA DELSD 03_04 0 PALMA DE MLSD 04_05 0 PALMA DE MALSD 05_06 0 LSD 0 0.00
                      
02_03 1 PALMA DELHD 03_04 0 PALMA DE MLHD 04_05 1 PALMA DE MALHD 05_06 0 LHD 0.4 0.55
                      
02_03 0 PALMA DEAOE 03_04 0 PALMA DE MAOE 04_05 0 PALMA DE MAAOE 05_06 0 AOE 0 0.00







02_03 2 VALLETTADDG 03_04 7 VALLETTA DDG 04_05 0 VALLETTA DDG 05_06 2 DDG 3 2.65
                      
02_03 3 VALLETTAFFG 03_04 0 VALLETTA FFG 04_05 3 VALLETTA FFG 05_06 1 FFG 1.4 1.52
                      
02_03 3 VALLETTACG 03_04 3 VALLETTA CG 04_05 2 VALLETTA CG 05_06 0 CG 1.6 1.52
                      
02_03 0 VALLETTACVN 03_04 0 VALLETTA CVN 04_05 0 VALLETTA CVN 05_06 0 CVN 0 0.00
                      
02_03 1 VALLETTALSD 03_04 0 VALLETTA LSD 04_05 1 VALLETTA LSD 05_06 0 LSD 0.4 0.55
                      
02_03 1 VALLETTALHD 03_04 3 VALLETTA LHD 04_05 0 VALLETTA LHD 05_06 0 LHD 1 1.22
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APPENDIX 4.  SERVICES SIMULATION REPORT 
STATISTICS 
Crystal Ball Report
Simulation started on 5/16/07 at 15:47:45
Simulation stopped on 5/16/07 at 15:54:29
Forecast:  FUEL MGO/F76
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 11000.00 
Entire Range is from 0.00 to 17310.56 


























0.00 2750.00 5500.00 8250.00 11000.00











Display Range is from 0.00 to 25000000.00 
Entire Range is from 920575.73 to 35533050.85 


























0.00 6250000.00 12500000.00 18750000.00 25000000.00
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Forecast:  WASTE OIL
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 2250000.00 
Entire Range is from 42661.69 to 4186610.52 


























0.00 562500.00 1125000.00 1687500.00 2250000.00
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Forecast:  WATER, POTABLE
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 900000.00 
Entire Range is from 17787.69 to 2271113.44 


























0.00 225000.00 450000.00 675000.00 900000.00
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Forecast:  WATER TAXI
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 8000.00 
Entire Range is from 5.28 to 22518.78 


























0.00 2000.00 4000.00 6000.00 8000.00
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Forecast:  TRASH REMOVAL
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 17500.00 
Entire Range is from 1810.12 to 34442.70 


























0.00 4375.00 8750.00 13125.00 17500.00
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Forecast:  TELEPHONE, CELLULAR
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 55000.00 
Entire Range is from 0.00 to 132214.55 


























0.00 13750.00 27500.00 41250.00 55000.00
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Forecast:  CAR RENTAL, SEDAN
Summary:
Display Range is from 250.00 to 2000.00 
Entire Range is from 355.00 to 2314.85 


























250.00 687.50 1125.00 1562.50 2000.00
10,000 Trials    10 Outliers
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Forecast:  BUS SERVICE
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 20000.00 
Entire Range is from 2319.45 to 29086.05 


























0.00 5000.00 10000.00 15000.00 20000.00
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Forecast:  FP, BARRIERS
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 9000.00 
Entire Range is from 534.87 to 12885.86 


























0.00 2250.00 4500.00 6750.00 9000.00
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Forecast:  FP, PICKET BOAT
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 500.00 
Entire Range is from 22.88 to 624.36 


























0.00 125.00 250.00 375.00 500.00
10,000 Trials    54 Outliers
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Forecast:  FP, OTHER
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 15000.00 
Entire Range is from 216.04 to 19535.54 
After 10,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 25.23
Statistics: Value
Trials 10000
Mean 6107.32 HR -- LT
Median 5828.02 HR -- LT
Mode ---




















0.00 3750.00 7500.00 11250.00 15000.00












Display Range is from 150.00 to 700.00 
Entire Range is from 150.15 to 855.33 


























150.00 287.50 425.00 562.50 700.00












Display Range is from 100.00 to 325.00 
Entire Range is from 63.37 to 380.26 


























100.00 156.25 212.50 268.75 325.00
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Forecast:  FP, PIER LIGHTING
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 7000.00 
Entire Range is from 111.00 to 8269.34 


























0.00 1750.00 3500.00 5250.00 7000.00
10,000 Trials    28 Outliers
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Forecast:  FP, SECURITY GUARD
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 15000.00 
Entire Range is from 674.38 to 17750.92 


























0.00 3750.00 7500.00 11250.00 15000.00
10,000 Trials    23 Outliers











Display Range is from 0.00 to 12000.00 
Entire Range is from 20.02 to 29428.43 


























0.00 3000.00 6000.00 9000.00 12000.00
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Forecast:  HUSBANDING SERVICE
Summary:
Display Range is from 100.00 to 600.00 
Entire Range is from 84.67 to 796.26 


























100.00 225.00 350.00 475.00 600.00
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Forecast:  CAR RENTAL, PASSENGER
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 3500.00 
Entire Range is from 313.51 to 4661.68 


























0.00 875.00 1750.00 2625.00 3500.00
10,000 Trials    61 Outliers
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